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We illustrate a novel informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. 
Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal 
(to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby 
mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. We establish a case for 
taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax. 
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 1. Introduction 
ision and/or subsidization of education is often warranted on 
efficien
                                          
Government prov
cy grounds, due to the existence of market failures, such as capital market 
imperfections [see, e.g., Barham et al. (1995)], moral hazard issues [see, e.g., Wilson 
(1999)], time inconsistency problems [see, e.g., Boadway et al. (1996) and Gradstein 
(2000)] and externalities [see, e.g., Eckstein and Zilcha (1994)]. The increase in 
earnings inequality over the last two decades is often attributed to the rise in the 
returns to education, thus rendering ever so relevant the debate on the role of publicly 
provided education in pursuing distributional goals.
1 When assessing the 
redistributive role of publicly provided education (as is often the case at the 
elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels) or subsidized privately acquired 
education (most relevant at post secondary level), one has to take into account the 
existence of other redistributive fiscal instruments; notably, the labor income tax 
system. Indeed the optimal tax literature has examined the productivity enhancing role 
of education, alongside redistributive taxation in settings with informational 
asymmetries [see, e.g., Sheshinski (1971), Ulph (1977) and Tuomala (1986) for early 
contributions; and more recently, Boadway and Marchand (1995) and Bret and 
Weymark (2003)]. These studies differ in the way the government role in the market 
has been modeled. In some studies, education is not a policy tool [see, e.g., Sheshinski 
(1971)]; while in others [see, e.g., Boadway and Marchand (1995)], compulsory 
publicly provided education is examined; and in still others [see, e.g., Bret and 
Weymark (2003)], subsidizing discretionary investment in education is analyzed. 
 
T P
1 P T   Correcting market failures need not necessarily stand in conflict with redistributive purposes. 
Thus, for instance, alleviating credit constraints may be pro-poor if, plausibly, the incidence of credit 
problems is higher amongst individuals coming from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds.  
  2  In this paper we attempt to illustrate a novel informational feature of 
education, which the government may utilize: discretionary decisions of individuals to 
acquire education may serve as a supplementary signal (to earned labor income) on 
the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational 
constraint faced by the government.
2 Notably, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
employing a generalized version of the original model of Mirrlees (1971), where 
individuals decide whether to acquire productivity-augmenting education, we 
illustrate that a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax,   
can be established.  
  The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the coming section 
we present the model. In section 3 we analyze the optimal policy. We conclude in 
section 4. 
 
2. The  Model 
Consider an economy with a continuum of individuals (whose number is 
normalized to one), producing a single consumption-good. The production technology 
employs labor only and exhibits constant returns to scale and perfect substitutability. 
Following Bret and Weymark (2003), we assume that individuals differ in two 
characteristics: the innate ability, denoted by w, and scholastic aptitude, which is 
given by the cost of acquiring education (in forgone consumption terms), denoted by 
e. For simplicity, we assume that for a proportion  1 0 1 < < γ  of the individuals 
(referred to as type 1), the cost of education is given by  , whereas the innate ability  1 e
                                            
T P
2 P T    The notion of using an education tax in a second best environment has been alluded to by Bret 
and Weymark (2003). The mechanism at work while employing such an education tax is closely 
related to the rationale for using commodity taxation as a supplement to income taxation, when 
additional information on unobserved innate ability can be inferred from variation in consumption 
patterns across individuals [see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Deaton (1979) and (1981), inter-alia, on 
this matter]. In this sense, education expenditure is analogous to consumption choice. 
  3is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function  , with w denoting 
innate ability. The cost of education and the cumulative distribution function of the 
innate ability of type-2 individuals (who constitute a fraction 
) ( 1 w G
1 2 1 γ γ − =  of the 
population) are given, respectively, by   and  . Both  and   have strictly 
positive densities and the same support - 
2 e ) ( 2 w G   1 G 2 G
] , [ w w . For concreteness we assume that 
. The cost-of-education and the innate ability characteristics are assumed to be 
private information. 
1 2 e e >
  We follow Saint-Paul (1994) and Razin and Sadka (2001), by assuming that 
the productivity of an individual of ability w, who acquires education, is given by aw, 
where a>1. We denote by  the productivity of an individual, where z aw z = , if an 
individual acquires education and w z = , otherwise. The productivity of an individual 
is also the wage rate she earns. 
  All individuals share the same preferences given by a quasi-linear utility 
function: 
(1)  ) ( ) , ( l h c l c U − = , 
where c denotes consumption, l denotes labor and h(l) is increasing, strictly convex 
and twice continuously differentiable.
3  
  We assume that a linear tax system is in place, where the marginal tax rate is 
denoted by t, and the uniform lump-sum transfer (possibly negative) is given by τ . A 
typical individual with characteristics   has two kinds of decision to make. She 
has to make a binary choice whether to acquire education or not (this will be formally 
given by an indicator function K, where K=1, if she acquires education and K=0 
otherwise); and she has to determine her labor supply. Consider first the labor supply 
) , ( e w
                                            
T P
3 P T   Including the right-derivative at l = 0. 
  4choice. An individual with productivity z is seeking to maximize the utility function in 
(1) subject to the following budget constraint: 
(2)  c zl t = + − τ ) 1 ( . 
Substituting the maximizing levels of consumption [ ) , , ( τ t z c ] and labor  ) , , ( [ τ t z l ] 
into the utility function in (1), one obtains an indirect utility function denoted by 
) , , ( τ t z V . Turing next to the education choice, recalling the quasi-linear specification 
of the utility function, and plausibly assuming that education costs are non tax 
deductible,
4 an individual with characteristics   acquires education if and only if 
the following condition holds: 
) , ( e w
(3)  e t w V t aw V ≥ − ) , , ( ) , , ( τ τ . 
It is straightforward to verify that: 
(4)  0 )] , , ( ) , , ( [ ) 1 (
)] , , ( ) , , ( [





t w l t aw l a t
w
t w V t aw V
,  
because l is strictly increasing with respect to productivity. We conclude that for each 
type j (j=1,2), there exits a cutoff level of innate ability,  , which is given by the 
implicit solution to: 
j w ˆ
(5)   j j j e t w V t w a V = − ) , , ˆ ( ) , , ˆ ( τ τ ,  2 , 1 = j , 
such that individuals acquire education if and only if their innate ability lies above this 
cutoff level. We plausibly assume that the cutoff (for each type) is bounded away 
from the lower bound of the support of innate abilities ( 2 , 1 , ˆ = > j w wj ). 
 
 
                                            
T P
4 P T    Note that the cost of education may be associated with both the pecuniary costs of education 
and the opportunity cost of forgoing labor time. The latter may be non deductible if we, plausibly, 
assume that students' incomes lie below the tax-threshold; namely, the minimum level of earnings 
above which individuals pay taxes. 
  53. The  Optimal  Policy 
  The government is seeking to maximize some egalitarian social welfare 
function by choosing the tax instruments, t and τ , subject to a revenue constraint, 
taking into account the optimal choices of the individuals. The social planner is 
assumed to have the following objective function: 


























w dG t w V W w dG e t aw V W W τ τ γ  
where   is given by equation (5), j=1,2, and where   and  , thus 
the welfare function is exhibiting strict inequality aversion. The objective in (6) is 
maximized subject to the government revenue constraint:  
j w ˆ 0 ) ( ' > V W 0 ) ( ' ' < V W
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w dG t w wl w dG t aw awl t , 
assuming, for simplicity, that the government has no revenue needs. 
Denote  the optimal tax parameters by  and . Under some general 
conditions, one can show (see appendix A for details) that the optimal marginal tax 
rate is positive ( ), and the lump-sum tax is negative ( <0). Thus, the labor 
income tax is progressive. Crucially note that as individuals differ in two 
characteristics (innate ability and scholastic aptitude), the non-negativity of the tax 
rate can not be ensured under the standard assumptions in the literature. To see the 
intuition for that, note that an individual with a given level of labor income can be of a 
relatively low innate ability but with high scholastic aptitude and vice versa. Thus, it 







                                            
T P
5 P T    Consider, for instance, two individuals: one whose innate ability is low but is gifted for 
schooling and the other with a reversed set of characteristics. If the income level of the former exceeds 
  6Under such circumstances, a progressive labor income tax system would stand in 
conflict with maximization of an egalitarian social welfare function. 
  We turn next to address the question of the desirability of using an education 
tax as a supplement to the optimal linear labor income tax system. For this purpose, 
we denote an education tax (possibly, negative) by s and examine whether, starting 
from an optimal linear tax system and zero tax on education (s=0), levying a small tax 
on education would increase welfare.
6 Note that when an education tax is introduced 
the cost of acquiring education for type-j individuals is given by  . Denote the 
Lagrangean expression for the optimal tax problem by: 
s ej +
(8)
, )] ˆ ( 1 [ ) ( ) , , ( ) ( ) , , (        
)] ( ) , , ˆ ( ) , , ˆ ( [        
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that of the latter, and the difference between the two income levels is sufficiently small, we obtain the 
negative correlation. 
T P
6 P T    Assuming that second order conditions are satisfied, this would imply that the optimal tax on 
education should be positive. Note that by education tax, we mean a (differential) lump-sum 
supplement to the labor income tax schedule. Thus, the education tax is paid over the whole working 
period of an individual, which is our stylized model is given by a single period. 
  7We seek to sign the following derivative (employing the envelope theorem): 
(9) 
], ) ˆ ( ˆ [ ) ( ) 1 /( ) , (                   
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w G w E t t K Cov





γ µ λ λ τ γ
τ
 
where  ' W ≡ θ denotes the social marginal utility of income, and   and are 
the covariance and expectation operators; see appendix B for details. 
) (⋅ Cov ) (⋅ E
  The interpretation of equation (9) is as follows. The first term on the extreme 
right-hand side captures the re-distributive component. This term measures the direct 
redistributive effect of a unit increase in the tax on education, accompanied by an 
optimal adjustment in the   pair. Note that the covariance term, ) , (
* * τ t ) , ( K Cov θ , is 
typically negative, as individuals to whom the government assigns higher social 
marginal utility of income (and hence are those targeted by the government to obtain 
transfers) are more likely not to acquire education.
7 Thus, the first term works in the 
direction of levying a tax on education as an equity enhancing tool. The second term 
on the extreme right-hand side captures the disincentive component (the efficiency 
cost) of a tax on education. This disincentive effect is measured by the reduction in 
labor income tax revenues (and, correspondingly, the lump-sum transfer) due to the 
reduced incentive to acquire education, with a corresponding reduction in aggregate 
labor income (see appendix C for derivation). Note that the disincentive component is 
                                            
7 Heckman (2000) provides evidence of college participation by 18-24 year old high-school graduates 
in the US. He shows that from 1970-1993 the participation rate of the top half of the family income 
distribution has grown to over 75 percent; whereas, for the bottom 25 percent, participation has 
stagnated at the 40-45 percent range. Thus assuming that the covariance term in expression (9) is 
negatively signed seems plausible. However, one has to control for capital market imperfections (as we 
assume no market failures in our model).  The extent to which credit issues induce under-representation 
of students from low socio-economic backgrounds in tertiary education is however debatable, as 
suggested by recent empirical evidence [see Carneiro and Heckman (2002)]. 
  8associated only with the reduced incentives to acquire education, as the tax on 
education does not distort the labor-leisure choice. This distortion exacerbates the 
already existing distortion associated with the positive labor income tax.
8 Thus, this 
term works in the opposite direction. Clearly, when the equity gains outweigh the 
efficiency costs, taxing education is desirable, and vice versa.  
We turn next to provide sufficient conditions for the equity gains to indeed 
outweigh the efficiency costs, thereby establishing a case for an education tax. To 
facilitate our interpretation we re-formulate equation (9). Note that the direct effect of 
a unit increase in the tax on education on government revenues is given by the 
number of individuals who acquire education; namely, . Dividing 
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α .  
The latter equation describes the change in welfare per marginal dollar raised by the 
tax on education. 
                                            
T P
8 P T    Note that when the labor income tax rate is zero the second term vanishes. 
  9Suppose that   takes the common CES form;  namely, 
 measures the degree of inequality aversion. Note that for 
the extreme case of a Rawlsian social planner, given by the limiting case 
where
) (⋅ W
1    where , / ) ( < = ρ ρ
ρ V V W
−∞ → ρ , the covariance term on the right-hand side of equation (9') reduces 





)] ˆ ( 1 [
j
j j w G γ 1 ) ( = θ E . Thus, 
equation (9') reduces to: 
(9'')  
.
) ˆ ( 1
) ˆ ( ˆ
) 1 /( 1










































Note that the second term on the right-hand side of equation (9'') captures the 
efficiency cost per marginal dollar raised by a unit increase in the education tax.  
Following Diamond (1998), we assume that the term , 
associated with the distribution of innate abilities for each type of individuals (j=1,2), 
is bounded from above.
)] ( 1 /[ ) (
' w G w G w j j − ⋅
9 This assumption is supported by empirical evidence. As 
shown by Saez (2001), analyzing US data, the term wG'(w)/[1-G(w)]  is increasing 
until very high productivity levels, above which the productivity distribution seems to 
be well approximated by a Pareto distribution. We denote by   the upper bound 
associated with the distribution , and let b denote the maximum between 
and . It follows that the weighted average on the right-hand side of equation (9'') 
j b
) (w Gj
  1 b 2  b
                                            
T P
9 P T   Diamond (1998) assumes that the distribution of innate abilities is single-peaked. He further 
assumes that for values above the modal skill level, innate abilities are distributed according to a 
Pareto distribution. It follows that the term wG'(w)/[1-G(w)] is increasing up to the mode [as G'(w) is 
increasing up to the modal skill], and by virtue of the properties of the Pareto distribution [the density 
G'(w) is proportional to  , for a>0], the term is constant above the modal skill level and given 
by a. Thus, the term wG'(w)/[1-G(w)] is indeed bounded from above by the parameter a. 
) 1 ( / 1
+ a w
  10is bounded from above by the parameter b. Thus, given the labor income tax, the 
parameter b provides an upper bound on the distortion associated with an education 
tax (the induced reduction in labor income tax revenues). When the value of this 
parameter is sufficiently small, the disincentive effect is weak, and a case of taxing 
education is established. 
An alternative interpretation of the Rawlsian  case follows directly from 
equation (9), which, in such a case, reduces to the following expression: 
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The interpretation of condition is straightforward. In the Rawlsian case, as the most 
disadvantaged individual is assumed not to acquire education, a small tax on 
education affects her well-being only through the transfer, τ . Thus, a small tax on 
education is desirable, if and only if it gives rise to an increase in government 
revenues, thereby allowing the government to offer a higher lump-sum transfer. The 
first term on the right-hand side of equation (9''') measures the direct effect of a unit 
increase in the tax on education on government revenues. The second term on the 
right-hand side of equation (9''') measures the indirect effect of a tax on education; 
namely, the reduction in labor income tax revenues due to the reduced incentive to 
acquire education associated with a unit increase in the labor income tax. When the 
first (direct) effect of an increase in tax revenues exceeds the second (indirect) effect 
of reduction in tax revenues, a tax on education raises government revenues and, 
consequently, the lump-sum transfer financed by these revenues. A case for an 
education tax is thus established. 
We state now the main result of the paper (for proof, see appendix D). 
  11Proposition: For  values  of  b   and   ρ sufficiently small, a small tax on education is 
welfare enhancing.
10  
The interpretation of the result is straightforward. When the objective of the 
government is sufficiently egalitarian (ρ  small enough), and the distortion caused by 
an education tax per dollar raised is bounded (small b), a case for an education tax is 
established.  
One particular interesting case to examine is when h is iso-elastic. One can 
show (see appendix E) that in the case of a Rawlsian social welfare function, a 
sufficient condition for the desirability of an education tax is that b > ξ , where ξ  
denotes the (constant) elasticity of labor supply. Thus, given the distribution of innate 
abilities, when labor-leisure distortion, as captured by the labor supply elasticity, is 
large enough, a case for an education tax is established. In such a case, the 
supplementary redistributive role of an education tax to the labor income tax is 
significant, due to the latter's large disincentive effect on labor-leisure choice. Note 
that unlike a labor income tax, which distorts both the labor-leisure choice and the 
education choice, an education tax distorts only the latter. 
 
4. Conclusions 
  In this paper we have employed a simple model where individuals differ in 
both innate ability and scholastic aptitude and examined the desirability of taxing 
(subsidizing) education, as a supplement to an optimal labor income tax system. The 
rationale for taxing education derives from the informational constraint faced by the 
government who can not observe the individual characteristics themselves (and thus 
                                            
T P
10 P T   Provided that second order conditions are satisfied, it follows that at the optimum, the tax on 
education should be positive. 
  12can not ideally base the tax on these characteristics). In a second best world, the 
variation in educational attainment across individuals can be used as a supplement to 
the observed variation in incomes, to infer about the individuals' unobserved 
characteristics, thereby enhancing the redistributive power of taxation.  
  It is important to qualify our results, by noting that there may well be other 
reasons to subsidize education; notably, the existence of an imperfect capital market 
which, given the uncertain nature of investment in human capital, imposes credit 
constraints on part of the population. In such a scenario, subsidizing education 
(directly or via tax breaks) is warranted on efficiency grounds, and it may well be the 
case, that all in all, the government would find it desirable to subsidize education.  
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  15Appendix A: Proof of Non Negativity of the Marginal Tax Rate 
We assume that second order conditions are satisfied, thus it suffices to show that the 
there exists a marginal welfare gain by slightly increasing the tax rate from t=0. 
Forming the Lagrangean, denoting by  µ λ   and   2 , 1 , = j j , the multipliers associated 
with the incentive constraints in (5), for type j=1,2, and the revenue constraint in (7), 
respectively, we seek to sign the following expression (suppressing the tax parameters 
to abbreviate notation):  
(A1)
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By virtue of the social planner's optimization, one obtains the following two first-
order conditions: 
(A2)  2 , 1 , 0 0 )] ˆ ( ) ˆ ( [
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Substituting for 2 , 1 , = j j λ  andµ , from (A2) and (A3) into (A1), simplifying and re-
arranging yields: 
(A4)  ] , [ 0 I Cov
t
L




  16where  ' W ≡ θ denotes the social marginal utility of income, I denotes labor income 
and   denotes the covariance operator.  ) (⋅ Cov
Clearly, in general, one can not sign the right-hand side of equation (A4), for reasons 
discussed in the text. However, in two simple cases the sign would be unambiguously 
Positive: first, in the case of a Rawlsian planner, seeking to maximize the well being 
of the least well-off individual (necessarily the one with the lowest income level, as 
the individual with the lowest innate ability is assumed to acquire no schooling, and is 
therefore the one with the lowest income level); second, when the difference between 
scholastic aptitudes,  ,  ∆ ≡ − 1 2 e e 0 > ∆ , is sufficiently small. The latter follows from 
the fact that when scholastic aptitude is identical for the two types ( ), 
individuals with a higher level of income are necessarily those with higher innate 
ability, hence higher well being. By virtue of continuity, this extends to the case of 
small values of .  
0 = ∆
0 > ∆
  More generally, when the correlation between innate ability and scholastic 
aptitude, and/or, the degree of inequality aversion exhibited by the social planner, is 
sufficiently high, the marginal tax rate will be positive. 
  17Appendix B: Derivation of Equation (9) 
For convenience we re-formulate equation (9), which is given by: 
(B1)
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By virtue of the social planner's optimization (employing the envelope theorem for 
the individual choice problem), one obtains the two following first-order conditions: 
(B2) 
2 , 1 ; 0 )] , , ˆ ( ) , , ˆ ( [
ˆ
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Substituting for 2 , 1 , = j j λ  andµ , from (B2) and (B3) into (B1), employing (4), 
simplifying and re-arranging terms yields: 
















  18Appendix C: The Indirect Effect of a Small Tax on Education  
Denote by  the labor income tax revenues when the tax levied on education is s 
and the labor income tax rate is t. Formally, is given by: 
) , ( t s R
) , ( t s R
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where , is given by the implicit solution to:  2 , 1 , ˆ = j wj
(C2)  0 ) ( ) , ˆ ( ) , ˆ ( = + − − s e t w V t w a V j j j . 
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Differentiation of the expression in (C1) yields: 
(C3)  [] .
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Fully differentiating the expression in (C2) with respect to s and re-arranging terms 
yields: 
(C4)  .
)] , ˆ ( ) , ˆ ( [ ) 1 (
1 ˆ









Substituting from (C4) into (C3) yields: 
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The second term on the extreme right-hand side of equation (9) is given by the 
product of the expression on the right-hand side of (C5) and the social marginal utility 
of income [ ) (θ E ]. Thus, it measures in utility terms the reduction in labor income tax 
revenues associated with a unit increase in the education tax. 
  19Appendix D: Proof of the Proposition 
We prove the result for the limiting case where  −∞ → ρ (a Rawlsian social planner). 
Then we extend the result by virtue of continuity. 
To prove the desirability of an education tax, it is sufficient to show that the 
expression on the right-hand side of condition (9''), which is re-produced by condition 
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Employing the assumption that the term   associated with the 
distribution of innate abilities for each type (j=1,2) is bounded from above, where the 
respective upper bounds are given by
)] ( 1 /[ ) (
' w G w G w j j − ⋅
2 , 1 , = j bj , and further recalling that 
, it suffices to show that: ) , max( 2 1 b b b ≡
11
(D2)  .  0 ] / ) 1 [(
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T P
11 P T   Recall that for the Rawlsian case, we show in appendix A that the marginal tax rate is positive. 
  20The individual optimal choice of labor is given by the implicit solution to: 
. Fully differentiating with respect to t yields:  0 ) ( ' ) 1 ( = − − l h w t
0












. Thus, it follows that: 
(D4)  0

















As the upper bound on the derivative in (D4) is independent of the parameter b, it 
follows that for all b (including values arbitrarily close to zero) the optimal tax rate is 
bounded away from unity. Formally:  . By virtue of continuity, the 
result is proved for sufficiently small values of b. QED 
1 ) ( lim
*
0 <
+ → b t b
  21Appendix E: A Sufficient Condition for the Desirability of an 
Education Tax for the Iso-elastic Case 
As shown in appendix D [see equation (D2)], to prove that education tax is desirable, 
it suffices to show that: 
(E1)  .  0 ] / ) 1 [(
* * > − − b t t Sign
Note that the Rawlsian optimum tax rate is bounded from above by the Laffer rate, 
namely, the tax rate that maximizes overall tax revenues. With an iso-elastic 
functional form, that is, , with  α
α / ) ( l l h = 1 / 1 + ≡ ξ α , where ξ >0 denotes the 
(constant) labor supply elasticity, this would imply that: 
(E2)  ,  ξ ξ > − ⇔ + <
* * * / ) 1 ( ) 1 /( 1 t t t


























w dG t w wl w dG t aw awl t t R γ . 
Assuming that second order conditions hold, it suffices to show that: 
(E4)  0








Differentiation of the expression on right-hand side of equation (E3) and re-
arrangement yield: 
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  22We turn next to sign the two terms [A(t) and B(t)] on the right-hand side of equation 
(E5), for ) 1 /( 1 ξ + = t . 
One can show that the labor supply for the iso-elastic case is given by: 
(E6)  .  ξ )] 1 ( [ ) , ( t w t w l − =
This implies that: 
(E7) 
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) , ( − − − =
∂




Employing (E6) and (E7), it is straightforward to verify that, for any w: 
(E8)  . 0
) 1 /( 1
) , (
) , ( =









t t w l  
Substitution into the term A(t) on the right-hand side of equation (E5), implies that 
0 )] 1 /( 1 [ = +ξ A .  














. It is thus straightforward to 
verify, recalling that a>1, that the term B(t) on the right-hand side of (E5) is 
negatively signed, for any positive value of t, hence  0 )] 1 /( 1 [ < +ξ B . Thus, we 
confirm that the derivative in (E4) is indeed negative hence the condition given in 
(E2) is confirmed. 
Substitution from (E2) into (E1) implies that a sufficient condition for the desirability 
of an education tax is: 
(E9)   b > ξ . 
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